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THE STATE ACTION PARADOX 
Louis Michael Seidman* 
It has been a quarter of a century since Charles Black began his 
famous Harvard Foreword somewhat plaintively and more than a 
little defensively by asking "State action again?"I It has been a full 
thirty years since Jerre Williams declared somewhat portentously 
and more than a little prematurely "The Twilight of State Action" 
in the title of his seminal article.2 Yet here we are, yet again, devot-
ing more space to another symposium on state action. Can't consti-
tutional scholars find something else to write about? Is it possible 
that there is anything new to say about state action? 
On the theory that we can't, but that there isn't, my strategy in 
this essay will be to retreat to the meta-level. I propose to ask: Why 
is it that we keep obsessively returning to the state action problem 
long after the basic analytics have been explicated and well under-
stood? Instead of proposing a solution to the state action problem, I 
want to ask: Why is the problem so resistant to satisfactory 
solution? 
My basic thesis is that we cannot stop talking about state ac-
tion because it is a symptom of a broader problem. The problem is 
produced by the partial but incomplete assimilation into our legal 
culture of realist insights from half a century ago. In the modern 
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period, we can neither escape nor fully accept these insights, and 
our ambivalent reaction to them has created antinomies that ob-
struct not only the creation of a coherent view of state action, but 
also the possibility of serious constitutional discourse on almost any 
subject. 
Along the way, I want to make two subsidiary claims, both of 
which are strongly counterintuitive. The first claim is that although 
we think of the state action limitation as a tool of judicial conserva-
tives, in fact the modem state action doctrine is almost entirely the 
creation of the liberal Justices who gained control of the Supreme 
Court in the wake of the 1937 Revolution. 
The second claim is that although we think of the state action 
requirement as an obstacle that prevents judicial enforcement of 
rights, the requirement is in fact a necessary prerequisite to the very 
idea of rights-that without it, rights, as generally understood, 
could not exist. 
I will take as my text the majority and dissenting opinions in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.3 I 
will argue that the problems confronted by each of the Justices in 
dealing adequately with the DeShaney controversy aptly illustrate 
our more general difficulty in resolving the state action paradox. 
I 
In Joshua DeShaney's first year of life, his parents divorced, 
and a court granted custody of the infant to his father, Randy 
DeShaney. For the next four years, the child lived through a 
nightmare of pain and violence. Randy DeShaney beat his son re-
peatedly and with increasing savagery. Eventually, the toddler fell 
into a life-threatening coma, and emergency brain surgery revealed 
injuries, inflicted over an extended period, that left Joshua perma-
nently and severely retarded. 
As these tragic events unfolded, many of them came to the at-
tention of county officials in the Wisconsin community where the 
DeShaneys lived. A battery of judges, lawyers, pediatricians, psy-
chologists, police officers and social workers became involved in 
Joshua's case. With Kafkaesque efficiency, each of these functiona-
ries performed their assigned task within the social welfare bureau-
cracy. They held hearings, filed reports, completed forms. Yet 
despite all the purposeful bustling and show of activity and concern, 
no one actually intervened to stop the violence until it was too late. 4 
3. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
4. See id. at 191-93. 
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After the damage had already been done, Joshua and his 
mother filed an action against the county in United States District 
Court. They argued that county officials had deprived Joshua of his 
liberty without due process of law, thereby violating his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If government officials had beaten Joshua themselves, his 
suit-even against their employers-might well have succeeded. 
Supreme Court cases make it clear that government agents who un-
justifiably inflict physical injury violate the Due Process Clause. 5 
But because Joshua and his mother could not claim that the injury 
was directly inflicted by state officials, the suit foundered on the 
state action requirement. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained 
when the case reached the Supreme Court, 
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause ... requires 
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens 
against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a 
limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of cer-
tain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State 
itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 
"due process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended 
to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that 
those interests do not come to harm through other means.6 
The Court's decision prompted two sharply worded dissents. 
Justice Brennan accused the majority of fundamentally mis-
characterizing the issue. The question, he insisted, was not whether 
"as a general matter, the Constitution safeguards positive as well as 
negative liberties." The focus should be "on the action that Wis-
consin has taken with respect to Joshua and children like him, 
rather than on the actions that the State failed to take."7 As Justice 
Brennan explained, Wisconsin had established an elaborate social 
welfare bureaucracy, and people could reasonably expect it to re-
spond to child abuse. 
In these circumstances, a private citizen, or even a person work-
ing in a government agency other than [the Department of Social 
Services], would doubtless feel that her job was done as soon as 
she had reported her suspicions of child abuse to [the Depart-
ment]. . . . Conceivably, then, children like Joshua are made 
worse off by the existence of this program when the persons and 
5. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165 (1952). 
6. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
7. ld. at 204-05. 
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entities charged with carrying it out fail to do their jobs.s 
In a separate dissent Justice Blackmun accused the majority of 
"sterile formalism" reminiscent of antebellum judges who justified 
slavery.9 Blackmun argued that existing precedent concerning the 
state action problem 
may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one 
chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a 
"sympathetic" reading, one which comports with dictates of fun-
damental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be ex-
iled from the province of judging.w 
In an extraordinary final paragraph of his opinion, Justice 
Blackmun lamented Joshua DeShaney's fate: 
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bul-
lying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by re-
spondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who 
knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially noth-
ing except, as the Court revealingly observes, . . . "dutifully re-
corded these incidents in [their] files." It is a sad commentary 
upon American life, and constitutional principles-so full of late 
of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about "liberty and 
justice for all''-that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is as-
signed to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded. II 
A 
None of the Justices' opinions makes much progress in under-
standing the constitutional issue created by Joshua DeShaney's 
tragedy. Consider first Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the 
Court. The Chief Justice argues that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
language clearly makes it apply only to injuries inflicted by the 
state. This position is untenable. 
Of course the command contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause is addressed to the government. The 
Clause prohibits the state from depriving individuals of life, liberty, 
or property.l2 The difficulty is that this verbal formulation is en-
tirely consistent with the view that the state is inflicting such a dep-
8. ld. at 209-10. 
9. ld. at 212. 
10. ld. at 213. 
II. Id. 
12. Interestingly, the parallel Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment (which ap-
plies on the federal, rather than the state level) contains no reference to government invasions 
of the right. Yet no one-least of all Chief Justice Rehnquist-has suggested that this differ-
ence in phrasing means that the Fifth Amendment Clause applies to private conduct. 
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rivation when officials organize their activities so that people fall 
prey to private violence. In the most literal sense, the state deprived 
Joshua DeShaney of his liberty when its employees went about their 
work without stopping the attacks directed against him. 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment reen-
forces this reading of it. The clear purpose of the Amendment was 
to expand the scope of government power to contend with private 
acts of violence. In the wake of the Civil War, Congress feared that 
the states of the recently defeated Confederacy would not do 
enough to ensure the freedom of the newly liberated slaves. The 
Civil Rights Act of 186613 provided direct federal protection for the 
freedmen. Among other things, the Act guaranteed all citizens 
"full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."I4 This provi-
sion was intended to provide positive protection through law 
against the private acts of violence and domination that were re-
placing the old slave system. As the Supreme Court wrote in its 
first decision interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress be-
lieved that "[the] lives [of African-Americans in the South] were at 
the mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their protection 
were insufficient or were not enforced."Is 
Fearing that the Supreme Court might overturn the 1866 Act 
on the ground that the federal government lacked constitutional au-
thority to intervene in these traditionally state matters, Congress 
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.I6 It expanded national au-
thority in order to prevent the reenslavement of African-Americans. 
In light of this history, it is hardly surprising that the Amend-
ment has often been read to require "the State to protect [individu-
als] from each other," despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's contention. 
Indeed, even he concedes that the Amendment would be violated if 
Wisconsin announced that it was henceforth no longer providing 
African-American children with protection from child abuse.J7 
Even though the state would be doing no more than failing to "pro-
tect [individuals] from each other," this failure would violate the 
central prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Of course, such a policy would involve overt racial discrimina-
13. 14 Stat. 27 (39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1866). 
14. ld. 
15. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873). 
16. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 257 (Harper & 
Row, 1988). Cf. Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 348 (U. of Chi. 
Press, 1960) (Fourteenth Amendment intended to prevent Democrats from repealing Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 if they gained control of Congress). 
17. 489 U.S. at 197 n. 3. 
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tion-an issue closer to the core concern of the Reconstruction 
Congress than the problem raised by DeShaney. But the Court long 
ago rejected the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was directed 
solely at race discrimination. Consider, for example, Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission.Js In Nollan, the Court held that the 
Due Process Clause had been violated when the state created a pub-
lic easement along a private beach without compensating the prop-
erty owner for the invasion. Creating an easement sounds like 
"positive" state action, and the Court did not even pause to think 
about whether there was a "state action" problem in the case. In 
fact, though, a public easement simply withholds the protections 
against private invasion that state trespass laws usually afford. The 
Court's holding thus rests on the proposition that the state may not 
withdraw "normal" property protections without first·providing ad-
equate compensation.'9 
If text and history fail to support the DeShaney decision, per-
haps a moral or political theory could. The decision raises troub-
ling questions about the moral and political significance of the 
distinction between nonfeasance ("not doing") and misfeasance 
("doing badly"). As used in DeShaney, the distinction gives pecu-
liar incentives to state officials. Social workers now know that they 
are best off not doing their jobs: The less they do, the more likely 
they are to escape constitutional liability. 
Even apart from these practical consequences, why, as a matter 
of principle, would a sensible constitution distinguish between ac-
tively bringing about bad results and passively allowing them to 
happen? Imagine that well-meaning but overzealous social worker 
Alice is horrified by Joshua's living conditions and immediately acts 
to remove him from his home without going to a judge or using 
other procedures required before parental rights are terminated. 
The misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction makes this "positive ac-
tion" subject to due process restrictions, and the action may well be 
18. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
19. Perhaps Nollan can be distinguished on the ground that when the state created the 
easement, it not only withdrew "normal" property protections previously enjoyed by the 
original owner, but also promised to provide such protections to the public if the original 
owner attempted to interfere with the easement. In contrast, the state's failure to intervene in 
DeShaney was not coupled with an immunization of parents against future legal action by 
their abused children. However, at the time of the Nol/an decision, the state had taken no 
positive action to enforce the easement. Nothing in the Nol/an opinion suggests that the 
result in that case turned on the implicit threat of future enforcement action if the original 
owner attempted to interfere with rights created by the easement. Moreover, in a different 
context, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held that the mere announcement of a 
property right, without actual state enforcement efforts, does not constitute state action. See 
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). It is therefore difficult to see why the hypo-
thetical threat of future enforcement distinguished Nol/an from DeShaney. 
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a constitutional violation. Yet if sadistic and cruel social worker 
Bennett, realizing that Joshua's father is about to inflict serious in-
jury on him which he could easily prevent, nonetheless deliberately 
leaves him in the home because he would like to see Joshua dead, 
the Constitution does not speak to this "mere failure to act." 
There may be a plausible political or moral theory to justify 
these results-this question is explored below2o_but Chief Justice 
Rehnquist does not suggest what such a theory would look like. If 
the Fourteenth Amendment's text or legislative history clearly man-
dated these outcomes, we would require no theory other than con-
stitutional originalism to justify them. Because they do not, we 
ought to assume that the Constitution's drafters meant to do some-
thing sensible-that they were reasonable people who wanted to 
achieve reasonable goals. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion turns 
this assumption on its head. 
B 
In light of these weaknesses in the argument for a state action 
requirement, one might have supposed that Justice Brennan's dis-
senting opinion would attack it. Instead, the opinion embraces the 
requirement. Rather than arguing that the Constitution speaks to 
state nonfeasance, Justice Brennan focuses on the ways in which the 
state made Joshua DeShaney's situation worse. By establishing a 
social welfare bureaucracy, he argues, the state discouraged private 
efforts that might otherwise have saved the boy. 
Justice Brennan directs our attention to one of the central di-
lemmas of state action analysis. What appears to be "mere" state 
inaction is always embedded in a network of state action. Courts 
will always have to choose whether to focus on the network or the 
"inaction." 
It is nonetheless striking that Justice Brennan accepts the ma-
jority's basic framework. Like Chief Justice Rehnquist, he looks for 
state action, rather than arguing that the state should be held liable 
for failure to act. Why does Justice Brennan choose to argue 
around the state action requirement rather than directly confront 
it? That question is especially vexing because the argument for state 
action that Justice Brennan advances has its own problems. 
It seems unfair to hold states responsible when they try to pre-
vent injury but fail, but not when they do nothing at all. According 
to Justice Brennan's arguments, the state could not be liable if it 
abandoned the child welfare business completely. For him, the 
20. See pp. 400-01, infra. 
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state's actions designed to provide at least some protection for 
abused children make those children worse off than they would be if 
left entirely to their own devices. That, however, runs against our 
strong intuitions. 
The best that Justice Brennan can do is claim that Joshua 
might "conceivably" have been better off in a world of no govern-
ment intervention because in such a world, private parties would 
not have come to rely on the social welfare bureaucracy: Joshua's 
neighbors might have come to his aid if they knew no public agency 
would. As this qualified language suggests, the claim rests on sheer 
speculation. Maybe Randy DeShaney was deterred from even 
greater violence by the state's limited intervention. And maybe 
DeShaney's neighbors or acquaintances would not have intervened 
anyway even if the state had remained passive. 
One of the difficulties with this sort of counterfactual is that it 
is very hard to know, or even guess with some confidence, how peo-
ple would act in the radically different alternative world we are 
asked to imagine. In a world with no social welfare bureaucracy 
and no laws against child abuse, what could concerned outsiders 
do? There would be no welfare worker to call and no law to invoke. 
They might attempt to take custody of Joshua by physical force, but 
why should we suppose that they would succeed?2I 
Moreover, how could we account for the unfamiliar social con-
ditions that would cause a society to repeal all of its laws against 
child abuse? Such a society would value children much less than 
ours does. Thus, even if we could count on bystander intervention 
to rescue Joshua in a society with our values, it does not follow that 
bystanders would be so motivated in this alternative world. 
Ultimately, this sort of speculation, which Justice Brennan's 
opinion invites, is profoundly beside the point. DeShaney is not 
about what the state did, but about what it failed to do. In that 
sense alone, the Chief Justice accurately stated the issue. 
To see why this is so, suppose Wisconsin had clearly put by-
standers on notice that they could not count on the state to inter-
vene in child abuse cases. On Justice Brennan's theory, that would 
21. One (concededly controversial) way to test these intuitions is by comparing an 
imagined world in which there are no laws against child abuse with our current world in 
which there are no laws against early abortions. In the absence of state regulation, antiabor-
tion groups like Operation Rescue have attempted to use self-help to protect fetuses. Their 
success in these efforts has been mixed at best. Both sides of the abortion debate seem to 
agree that fewer fetuses would be aborted in a world with even inadequately enforced an-
tiabortion laws than in our current world of almost complete deregulation. There is no rea-
son to doubt this conclusion or to think that a different conclusion follows regarding the 
regulation of child abuse. 
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eliminate the risk of private reliance on state action and eliminate 
the reasons for holding the state constitutionally liable for Joshua's 
injuries. But in fact the state did just that. The Supreme Court held 
that the state had no constitutional duty to protect children from 
their parents, and Wisconsin, by the very act of resisting Joshua 
DeShaney's lawsuit, served notice that it would not assume the duty 
voluntarily. Even if the risk of state nonintervention was unclear 
before DeShaney was decided, it is crystal clear now. Is it plausible 
that many who agreed with Justice Brennan's dissent when it was 
written have suddenly come to think that it is constitutionally fine 
for social workers to continue to ignore cases like Joshua's? 
Moreover, even if we treat DeS haney as a case about the state's 
actions, Justice Brennan's dissent concentrates on state action hav-
ing only the most marginal and doubtful relationship to Joshua's 
injury, while ignoring the state action that really did cause it: 
Through its custody rules and decisions, the state gave Randy 
DeShaney the opportunity to wreak violence against his son. 
The state rules distributing children among adult caretakers al-
most always "cause" child abuse in the sense that the abuse would 
not have occurred had the state made a different choice. Recall the 
DeShaney divorce and the state court decision awarding custody to 
Randy rather than to Joshua's mother. Even if we ignore the judi-
cial decree (entered by the court of a different state before the 
DeShaneys moved to Wisconsin), the Wisconsin custody rules still 
created what amounted to a brutal prison for Joshua. These rules 
could be taken as a paradigm of government action that violates due 
process. They allocate children to biological parents without any 
investigation of their fitness or any opportunity for a hearing. Once 
this initial allocation is made, it is backed up by all the state's coer-
cive powers. If Joshua DeShaney ran away from home, state of-
ficers would return him to his father. If other adults attempted to 
rescue him, they would have been arrested for kidnapping. Why 
does Justice Brennan (as well as the rest of the Court) ignore this 
obvious state action? 
Sections III and IV explore some of the reasons that might 
have caused Justice Brennan to ignore these state custody rules as 
well as the reasons that would cause him to deny that the case, at its 
core, raises issues about inaction rather than action. Before turning 
to these matters, however, we need to examine the last of the 
Supreme Court's DeShaney opinions. 
c 
Although the briefest and most elliptical of the opinions filed in 
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the case, Justice Blackmun's dissent also raises the most troubling 
issues. For Justice Blackmun, the Court's effort to draw "a sharp 
and rigid line" between action and inaction is "formalistic" and un-
convincing.22 He argues that the constitutional text and the Court's 
decisions leave the Justices with a choice whether or not to find 
state action. The Court should make this choice, Justice Blackmun 
writes, by adopting a "sympathetic" reading of the law that "com-
ports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that com-
passion need not be exiled from the province of judging. "23 
The great strength of Justice Blackmun's opinion is his honest 
acknowledgement of the legal rule's indeterminacy. Ironically, this 
strength makes apparent the weak undergirding of all the opinions, 
including his own. By admitting that the Constitution affords the 
Justices a considerable measure of freedom to rule either way, Jus-
tice Blackmun raises the most familiar problem of liberal constitu-
tionalism. If he is right-if text and doctrine leave the Justices 
unconstrained- why should we prefer the Justices' unfettered intu-
itions about the "dictates of fundamental justice" to those of the 
rest of us (as expressed by politically accountable public officials)? 
Additional problems emerge when Justice Blackmun attempts 
to tell us what the "dictates of fundamental justice" require in 
DeShaney. Instead of an argument on this score, Justice Blackmun 
concludes his opinion with an extraordinary lament concerning 
"poor Joshua's" fate.24 Readers will differ on whether this rhetoric 
is powerful or only maudlin. To the extent that it is effective, it 
gains its power from making the consequences of the Court's deci-
sion concrete. It focuses the reader on Joshua's individual story 
and away from abstract and general theorizing. 
The problem here is that arguments about justice are, necessar-
ily, arguments about more than a particular individual. Doing jus-
tice always involves mediating between the general and the 
particular. A just outcome gives the individual his or her due ac-
cording to some more general precept that one is prepared to apply 
over the range of cases. 
Justice Blackmun's emphasis on the particular, and disregard 
of the general, is especially anomalous in DeShaney. Money dam-
ages might make Joshua's life somewhat more comfortable, but no 
damage award, no Supreme Court decision, no constitutional doc-
trine will give him back his stolen future. The argument that a rule 
based on Joshua's case will serve justice must therefore be mainly 
22. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212. 
23. ld. at 213. 
24. ld. 
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forward-looking. Justice Blackmun's opinion makes sense only if a 
decision for Joshua and his mother will make social workers more 
careful in the future and prevent more such tragedies. That argu-
ment is not about any particular story. It is about the general, 
anonymous, and collective impact of legal rules. 
Once we get away from Joshua's particular story, the dictates 
of justice-and the courts' authority to determine them-become 
less clear. Money damages awarded against social workers who fail 
to intervene when they suspect child abuse will certainly produce 
more intervention-where it is unwarranted as well as where it is 
warranted. Social workers will act more quickly to remove children 
from homes where they are at risk. But they will also be quicker to 
remove children from their homes where there is no need to do so. 
As a social scientist might put it, a stricter liability regime will pro-
duce fewer "false negatives" at the expense of more "false posi-
tives." Whether this change is a good thing will depend on an 
empirical judgment about the numbers of each sort of mistake and a 
value judgment about which kind of mistake is more serious. 
Nor is that the end. Even if we decided in favor of greater 
protection against child abuse, we can achieve it only by spending 
more money. If we are serious about earlier and more frequent in-
tervention, we will need more training and supervision of social 
workers, more juvenile court judges, more foster parents, more 
group homes. 
Perhaps our economic resources should be directed in this 
fashion, but we cannot be sure until we know where the money 
comes from. Do the benefits of using tax dollars this way outweigh 
the benefits of using them for other worthy programs like running 
public hospitals, providing police protection, or furnishing prenatal 
care to impoverished pregnant women? 
It turns out, then, that the underlying issue in DeShaney is 
complex, not simple. It is the kind of question about which "policy 
wonks" write long and boring Ph.D. dissertations. To resolve it in a 
sensible fashion, we would need to know many facts which, if avail-
able at all, are not likely to be in the trial record upon which the 
Supreme Court bases decision. And even if we had access to these 
facts, we would still need to make a series of value judgments about 
which reasonable people surely differ. 
It is difficult to know how a Supreme Court Justice should act 
in the face of this uncertainty. It does seem clear, though, that Jus-
tice Blackmun's focus on the single case of "poor Joshua" tends to 
distract us from the real and painful choices that confront the 
Court. 
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There is nonetheless something to be said for Justice Black-
mun's rhetoric. His insistence that we pay attention to Joshua's in-
dividual story reminds us that all of life is not policy analysis. We 
tend to make fun of "policy wonks" precisely because their preoccu-
pation with costs and benefits blinds them to facts that cannot be 
captured in bloodless statistics. 
Although Justice Blackmun is right to remind us of this, the 
final irony is that the reminder serves to reenforce his opponents' 
position. To see why, we need to revisit the concept of a private 
sphere. When Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court a generation 
ago to affirm a woman's constitutional right to an abortion,2s he 
said, in essence, that a woman should be allowed to make this deci-
sion as part of her own, individual life story. The decision is private 
precisely because it ought not to be judged on the basis of abstract 
policy analysis. Whether the decision maximizes social welfare is 
irrelevant; whether it protects some abstract notion of autonomy is 
irrelevant; all that matters is that it is the decision made by this 
woman under the particular circumstances of her life. 
Justice Blackmun's lament for "poor Joshua" reminds us that 
an analogous sphere of individualism and privacy surrounds child-
rearing decisions. Most of us think that parental interaction with 
children is also an act of self-definition that forms a part of the life 
story individuals make for themselves. It is therefore important 
that the relationship between parents and children remain in the 
realm of individual autonomy. Most child-rearing decisions should 
be free of government control, even if some of the choices parents 
make-about what kind of education or what kind (if any) of reli-
gious instruction their children receive, for example--cannot be jus-
tified on general public policy grounds. Indeed, Roe itself relied 
heavily on a series of Supreme Court decisions creating constitu-
tional protection for this sphere.26 
Of course, no one thinks that this sphere ought to include the 
right to beat a child senseless. But an unavoidable consequence of 
holding social workers liable for failing to remove children from 
their homes is to encourage greater public supervision and control 
over a range of child-rearing decisions. Risk-averse social workers 
threatened by liability suits will not only be quicker to remove 
children from the home. They will also be quicker to threaten re-
moval unless parents comport with state-approved child-rearing 
standards. 
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
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Such public processes will not-and ought not-focus on the 
individual stories of children and parents. Social welfare bureaucra-
cies will formulate general policies thought to be in the interests of 
society as a whole. When Justice Blackmun focuses our attention 
on "poor Joshua," he reminds us of the risks that inhere in desic-
cated, dehumanizing generalizations that subsume the individual 
stories of real people. He fails to see that these risks provide the 
primary argument for keeping child-rearing in a private sphere free 
from government intervention. 
II 
Each of the three DeShaney opinions is, in its own way, uncon-
vincing. None provides a persuasive framework in which to sort 
out the public from the private. Unfortunately, these difficulties are 
not confined to the narrow problem of state responsibility for child 
abuse. No area of constitutional law is more confusing and contra-
dictory than state action. 
Anyone who has ever taken an introductory course in constitu-
tional law will find these dilemmas depressingly familiar. For ex-
ample, in the famous case of Shelley v. Kraemer,27 the Court held 
that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants on real 
property constituted "state action" sufficient to trigger Fourteenth 
Amendment protections. On one level, state court enforcement of 
these provisions is obviously the action of the state; whose action 
could court enforcement be? However, a moment's reflection 
makes clear that all private action ultimately rests on the state's 
willingness to enforce the civil and criminal rules that facilitate that 
action. Writing a will that gives money to some people but not to 
others or inviting some people but not others to dinner are familiar 
examples. Yet the Court has never held that courts cannot enforce 
wills according to their terms unless the courts are satisfied that the 
money is distributed fairly, or that the police cannot help a home-
owner eject an intruder from the dining room unless they are satis-
fied that the homeowner is not motivated by racial hatred. The 
Court has never explained why these cases are different from 
Shelley. 
More recently, in Rendell-Eaker v. Kohn,2s the Court said that 
government conduct should be treated as state action only if the 
government affirmatively commands or encourages private individ-
uals to engage in the constitutionally questionable conduct. The 
27. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
28. 457 u.s. 830 (1982). 
392 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:379 
Court found that a "private" school that received almost all its 
budget from state funds was not a state actor when it fired an em-
ployee under circumstances that arguably violated the employee's 
Due Process and First Amendment rights. For the Court, the firing 
decision was "not compelled or even influenced by any state regula-
tion, "29 and therefore could not be attributed to the state. 
Unfortunately, the Court made no serious effort to reconcile 
this result with prior decisions in which it found state action despite 
the absence of state compulsion or influence. In Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority,3o the issue was whether the racially discrimi-
natory policies of a private restaurant that rented space in a publicly 
owned garage were attributable to the state. Although the govern-
ment had done nothing to compel or influence the restaurant to ex-
clude African-Americans, the Court nonetheless found a sufficiently 
close "nexus" with the state to establish state action. 
Maybe Rende/1-Baker implicitly overruled Burton. How, then, 
are we to explain the Court's holding, five years after Rendell-
Boker, that a "private" doctor working under contract at a state 
prison was a state actor even though the prison in no way compelled 
or influenced the treatment decisions attacked as violating the pris-
oners' constitutional rights?3I 
Analytic confusion of this sort, to which one could add many 
more examples, has led many commentators to suggest that the 
state action analysis ought to be abandoned altogether. Why not 
simply concede that state action is always present in some form and 
move directly to an analysis of whether the state action is constitu-
tionally permissible?32 On this view, the Shelley Court erred info-
cusing on whether judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants was 
state action (it obviously was) instead of the harder question of 
whether such enforcement violates the Constitution. Similarly, a 
court applying this approach in DeShaney would acknowledge that 
the enforcement of child custody rules was state action--or ignore 
the question entirely-and then move on to the question whether 
these rules, as applied in Joshua DeShaney's case, violated his con-
stitutional rights. 
In light of the confusion produced by the state action inquiry, 
this approach is certainly attractive. Unfortunately, however, it 
only shifts the problem without really solving it, because something 
29. ld. at 841. 
30. 365 u.s. 715 (1961). 
31. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). 
32. See, e.g., Robert J. Glennon, Jr. and John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the 
Founeenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 221; Laurence H. 
Tribe, Constitutional Choices 255 (Harv. U. Press, 1985). 
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like the state action doctrine-together with all the uncertainty and 
incoherence that accompanies it-is built into how we think about 
constitutional rights. 
Consider, for example, the constitutional right most closely as-
sociated with Justice Blackmun-the right to an abortion. Roe v. 
Wade stands for the proposition that there is a sphere of privacy 
within which each woman has a right to decide for herself whether 
she ought to have an abortion. As Justice Blackmun's Roe opinion 
makes clear, the state may not invade this sphere simply because it 
disagrees with the woman's judgment about the profound and diffi-
cult moral issues raised by abortion. Put simply, the choice must be 
left to the individual and cannot be exercised by the state. 
It is hard to reconcile this position with Justice Blackmun's 
stance in DeShaney. Just as there are background facts that allow 
us to attribute Randy DeShaney's actions to the state if we are so 
inclined, so too, a "sympathetic" Justice could attribute a woman's 
abortion decision to the state: Inadequate state efforts to provide 
counseling and health benefits for pregnant mothers and scandal-
ously insufficient child services for new infants directly cause many 
decisions to abort fetuses in just the way the state caused Joshua's 
injuries. 
If we were to find state action in the Roe context, however, the 
individual right to an abortion would collapse. It makes no sense to 
claim that a woman has a right to make the abortion decision free 
from state intervention if the decision is attributable to the state. 
As the abortion example illustrates, the state action problem 
cannot be avoided by focusing on the scope of the substantive con-
stitutional right at stake. All substantive rights rest on the assump-
tion that we can define a sphere of private conduct not attributable 
to the state. The effort to bound this sphere necessarily rein-
troduces through the back door all the confusion that surrounds 
state action analysis. 
For example, Justice Blackmun's DeShaney dissent tells us that 
a judge deciding how to pay attention to these background facts 
should look to the "dictates of fundamental justice." But the core 
holding of Roe is that public officials (including judges) have no 
business deciding questions of "fundamental justice" with regard to 
matters, like abortion, that belong in the private sphere. We are 
thus left with this central contradiction: The abortion right rests on 
the premise that decisions about the justice of particular abortions 
should be left to the private sphere. But the very existence of the 
private sphere seems to turn on a public decision regarding the jus-
tice of decisions made within it. 
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Perhaps Justice Blackmun thought that the difference was be-
tween a public decision to define a protected private sphere, and 
private decisions within that sphere. Still, the boundaries of the pri-
vate sphere will inevitably be defined by a public determination 
that, overall, we are better off accepting some unfortunate private 
decisions than attempting to intervene whenever some other public 
body-such as the child welfare agency in DeShaney-notices a de-
cision that it thinks wrong. A public assessment of the justice of 
particular decisions necessarily accompanies a decision to draw the 
private sphere's boundaries here-including this decision along with 
many others-rather than there-including only the other 
decision.33 
It turns out, then, that the Court's problem articulating a con-
vincing version of the state action doctrine is very serious indeed. It 
threatens the coherence of not only those cases that the Court labels 
as posing "state action" problems, but the very enterprise of consti-
tutional review. What stands in the way of developing a sensible set 
of principles that we might use to map the boundary between the 
public and private? 
III 
We can begin to answer this question by examining the history 
of the state action doctrine. When one does so, a striking fact 
emerges: Before the New Deal transformation of constitutional 
doctrine, the Court exhibited little interest in the state action re-
quirement, at least in the modern sense. 
In a few cases growing out of Reconstruction, the Court ap-
plied something it called a state action requirement. The most fa-
mous of these, the Civil Rights Cases,34 invalidated the Civil Rights 
Act of 187535 on state action grounds. But although the Court used 
the language of state action, the nineteenth century requirement dif-
fered from the modern one. 
The 1875 Civil Rights Act guaranteed to all persons "the full 
and equal enjoyment" of all public accommodations, inns and pub-
lic conveyances without regard to race or previous condition of ser-
vitude.36 Congress enacted the law under power granted in § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorized it to enforce the sub-
33. Perhaps the public institution defines the protected sphere by referring to some 
"natural" rights of parents and children. Difficulties associated with that solution are dis-
cussed below. See pp. 401-03, infra. 
34. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
35. 18 Stat. 335 ( 43rd Con g., 2nd Sess. 1875). 
36. ld. 
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stantive provisions of the Amendment by appropriate legislation. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley held that the law exceeded 
Congress' powers because the acts of private individuals could not 
constitute a denial of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
The case differs from modem versions of the state action re-
quirement in two ways. First, Justice Bradley did not assert, as 
Chief Justice Rehnquist did in DeShaney, that the states had no 
positive obligation to act against private individuals threatening 
constitutional rights. On the contrary, in private correspondence, 
Justice Bradley made clear his view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
not only prohibits the making or enforcing of laws which shall 
abridge the privileges of the citizen; but prohibits the states from 
denying to all persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws .... Denying includes inaction as well as action. 
And denying the equal protection of the laws includes the omis-
sion to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for 
protection.37 
Justice Bradley's quarrel with the Civil Rights Act was not that it 
affirmatively protected rights from private violations. Rather, his 
claim was that these rights had not been violated so long as the state 
stood ready to provide a remedy for private misconduct. On his view 
the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional because it mandated fed-
eral intervention even where the states prohibited racial discrimina-
tion. The Act 
does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong 
committed by the States .... It applies equally to cases arising in 
States which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights 
of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such 
laws, as to those which arise in States that may have violated the 
prohibition of the [fourteenth] amendment. In other words, it 
steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, and lays down rules 
for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and 
imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those rules, without re-
ferring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its 
authorities. 38 
Thus, if Justice Bradley had been confronted with the 
DeShaney problem, he might well have found a constitutional viola-
tion so long as Wisconsin did not allow Joshua and his mother to 
recover damages, under state law, from the social workers. 
37. The letter is quoted in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 309·10 (1964) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
38. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14. 
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The nineteenth century version of the state action requirement 
also differed from its modem counterpart in a second way. For Jus-
tice Bradley, the issue in the Civil Rights Cases was whether the 
federal government had the power to prohibit private discrimina-
tion in public accommodations. The holding was that no provision 
in the Constitution gave Congress this power and that a law pur-
porting to exercise it was therefore unconstitutional. 
The structure of Chief Justice Rehnquist's DeShaney opinion is 
very different. Wisconsin, and Congress as well, had the power to 
prevent Randy DeShaney from harming his son; the issue was 
whether the Constitution required either government to exercise 
this power. 
These differences have important implications for the meaning 
of and justification for the state action requirement. Justice Bradley 
saw the doctrine as limiting the power of the political branches of 
the national government; Chief Justice Rehnquist understands that 
the power of those branches has already been expanded and sees the 
doctrine as limiting only the power of the federal courts. For Brad-
ley, the doctrine defined a prohibited realm where federal courts 
would prevent the government from acting; for Rehnquist, it identi-
fies a discretionary realm where governments are free to act or not 
as they choose, without federal judicial intervention. 
This change creates new problems in explaining why we should 
have such a requirement. If the government is constitutionally for-
bidden to intervene, then it is obvious that it should bear no respon-
sibility for its failure to do so. Justice Bradley's version of the state 
action requirement therefore did not force him to confront the vex-
ing moral and philosophical problem of distinguishing between re-
sponsibility for acts and omissions. Indeed, as Justice Bradley's 
correspondence makes clear, he thought this difference unimportant 
and viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting government 
acts and omissions that harmed the newly freed slaves. 
In contrast, the distinction between acts and omissions is cen-
tral to modem articulations of the state action requirement. 
DeShaney leaves no doubt that Wisconsin had the power to do 
something about Randy DeShaney's violence if it chose to act. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, unlike Justice Bradley, must confront the 
knotty problem of whether to attribute responsibility for "mere" 
failures to act. If Wisconsin could have prevented Joshua 
DeShaney's injury and chose not to do so, why should it not bear 
constitutional responsibility for its decision? 
Although a handful of pre-1937 cases foreshadow a reformu-
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lated state action doctrine,J9 the Court did not begin to develop the 
modem requirement until the New Deal. The modem state action 
doctrine emerged with the victory of the liberal Roosevelt appoin-
tees over the free market ideology of the Old Court. We cannot 
understand why state action issues are so hard without first coming 
to grips with the reasons why these liberals needed to create a state 
action doctrine and the ways in which the doctrine relates to the 
transformation of constitutional law that occurred in the wake of 
1937. 
A central element of the 1937 Revolution was the systematic 
dismantling of the public/private distinction. The attack on the dis-
tinction proceeded on several levels. First, the old natural rights 
ideology that carved out a public sphere from a preexisting and nat-
ural realm of private economic freedom collapsed. When the Court 
overruled Lochner, it effectively eliminated constitutional impedi-
ments to government regulation of the economy. The extent of gov-
ernment intervention became a matter of discretion and policy, 
rather than of necessity and right. 
Second, New Dealers criticized the action/inaction dichotomy. 
The Court came to understand that inaction was a kind of action: 
The government was always confronted with the option of reallo-
cating burdens and benefits or leaving them undisturbed. The issue 
was clearly posed in the path-breaking case of Miller v. Schoene.40 
When owners of cedar trees complained that the state had unconsti-
tutionally taken their property by ordering the destruction of the 
cedars so as to save adjacent apple trees from blight, Justice Stone 
pointed out that both destroying the cedars by action and destroy-
ing the apples by inaction involved governmental choice. Because 
both decisions were "public," there was no refuge from public re-
sponsibility for the outcomes. 
Finally, the Roosevelt administration took advantage of the 
new powers granted to government to inaugurate the modem regu-
latory state. Broad areas of the economy that had previously been 
left to private contract were now subject to explicit government reg-
ulation. Obviously, the popularity of the New Deal transformed 
public attitudes about the importance of respecting a private eco-
nomic sphere. Beyond these changes in public perceptions, how-
ever, the growth of government regulation threatened the very 
concept of a private sphere. Where government regulation was the 
norm rather than the exception, virtually all conduct came to be 
39. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Roman Catholic Church of St. 
Anthony v. Pennsylvania R.R., 237 U.S. 575 (1915). 
40. 276 u.s. 272 (1928). 
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seen as, in some sense, resting on an entitlement created by 
government. 
For these reasons, the 1937 Revolution left the public/private 
distinction in tatters. But, although the story of its demise has been 
told many times, most renditions have ignored a remarkable para-
dox: At the moment when the distinction collapsed as a limitation 
on governmental power, it replicated itself as a limitation on federal 
judicial power. For the very reason that Lochner-like reasoning was 
rejected as a restraint on government intervention, it had to be ac-
cepted as a restraint on judicial intervention. 
What would a post-1937 world have looked like without are-
formulated state action doctrine? The constraints that Justice Brad-
ley perceived on what the government could do had been swept 
away. It was no longer true, as it was in 1883 when the Civil Rights 
Cases were decided, that federalism limitations prevented the na-
tional government from acting to deal with "local" problems. More 
broadly, no natural or pre-existing private sphere prevented either 
federal or state governments from intervening to redistribute eco-
nomic resources. 
When this new empowerment was coupled with the critique of 
the action/inaction distinction, courts would have been free to or-
der a comprehensive reallocation of resources on their own initia-
tive. Since the government was now empowered to distribute goods 
in any way it chose, its failure to do so had to be treated as a gov-
ernmental decision that was subject to constitutional review. 
Miller v. Schoene again serves as an apt example. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, Justice Stone's reasoning meant not just that the 
government's destruction of the cedar trees was not a taking for 
constitutional purposes. It also meant that the failure to destroy 
the cedar trees might be a taking of the apple trees. Because inac-
tion is a kind of action and because there was nothing "natural" or 
"pre-existing" about the spread of disease from the cedars to the 
apples, the government's failure to destroy the cedars constituted a 
possible "taking" of the apples subject to constitutional review and 
judicial control. 
Although this potential reallocation of power between the 
courts and the political branches was immanent in the 1937 Revolu-
tion, it also contradicted one of its core premises. President 
Roosevelt and his allies insisted that the Revolution was triggered 
by judicial arrogation of power properly exercised by the political 
branches. Turning every policy decision into an issue of constitu-
tional law, to be finally resolved by unelected Justices on the 
Supreme Court, would have made a mockery of the bitter struggle 
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against the Old Court. Restraint of the judiciary was therefore nec-
essary to make the space for the newly unrestrained political 
branches to engage in the vigorous government intervention at the 
heart of the New Deal. 
We are now in a position to understand why Justice Brennan's 
DeShaney dissent accepts the state action requirement as a given 
instead of launching a frontal assault against it. Although they rep-
resent sharply conflicting judicial ideologies, both Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Brennan are heirs of the 1937 Revolution. 
Both understand that most decisions of government are questions of 
policy, and that the Constitution should be read to give the political 
branches broad discretion in resolving them. Both understand that 
a state action requirement shields these policy questions from con-
stitutional review except where government conduct invades a pro-
tected private sphere. 
We are now also in a position to understand why the opinions 
of the Justices applying the state action requirement are bound to be 
unsatisfactory. The critique of the public/private distinction that 
made a reformulated state action doctrine necessary also makes it 
impossible. In the post-1937 regime, the Court can no longer talk 
convincingly of the distinction between acts and omissions, or of a 
natural and pre-existing private sphere not constituted by public de-
cisions. It is therefore as difficult to utilize state action rhetoric as a 
restraint on judges as it is to utilize it as a restraint on government 
as a whole. 
Thus, state action cases are hard because the 1937 Revolution 
necessitated a newly formulated state action requirement to curb 
judicial power, and simultaneously demolished the analytic tools 
that could have been used to articulate the requirement convinc-
ingly. In the modem period, without a natural and pre-existing dis-
tinction between public and private, a state action requirement is 
essential to prevent every policy question from becoming an issue 
for constitutional interpretation. But the death of the public/pri-
vate distinction also dooms any effort to justify the state action re-
quirement or to distinguish action from inaction. 
IV 
The preceding discussion helps explain why constitutional 
rhetoric about state action is so unconvincing. It is not quite the 
whole story, however. We still need to understand why all the Jus-
tices selectively use state action rhetoric. For example, why does 
Justice Brennan see state action in Wisconsin's establishment of a 
child welfare system but remain blind to the state's action when it 
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chooses to allocate infants to their biological parents? Why does 
Justice Blackmun think that the government should accept respon-
sibility for Joshua DeShaney's beating, but not for Jane Roe's abor-
tion? Why does Chief Justice Rehnquist think that withdrawing 
state protection from property is state action, while withdrawing 
state protection from child abuse is not? 
It is tempting to attribute these inconsistencies to the cynical 
manipulation of constitutional doctrine to achieve ideological goals. 
But this view reverses the actual relationship between ideology and 
doctrine. Of course the Justices have ideological presuppositions, 
but these presuppositions themselves rest on beliefs about the "nat-
uralness" of differently defined private spheres. And without such a 
belief, it is hard to know how constitutional argument could 
proceed. 
We can gain some insight into this problem by examining an-
other of the contradictions in the 1937 Revolution. Although the 
New Dealers were intent on upsetting the old order, they were 
hardly nihilists. They had absorbed the rhetoric and analytical 
tools of the Legal Realists, but they rejected the most radical and 
destabilizing implications of Realism. 
Nowhere is this ambivalence about the lessons of Legal Real-
ism more apparent than in the post-1937 treatment of a private 
sphere. As already noted, the Realist assault on the public/private 
distinction played a crucial role in justifying the New Deal. Histori-
cally, the ideology of natural rights and of a private sphere had been 
used to justify the suppression of relatively powerless groups-pri-
marily workers, secondarily women-within that sphere. For polit-
ical liberals, committed to the welfare of the dispossessed, 
debunking this ideology was crucial. The Legal Realists helped ex-
plain why the government was responsible for outcomes in the pri-
vate sector and why it was legitimate for the government to regulate 
"private" transactions. 
Yet, although the Realist arguments were useful in dismantling 
the old order, they obstructed the effort to build a new one. While 
political liberals resented the use of privacy rhetoric to shield distri-
butions of wealth and power from public criticism, they could not 
make their own arguments for redistribution without relying on 
some normative vision of what people were "naturally" entitled to 
in a just society. Political liberals who supported the New Deal 
therefore could not wholly embrace the skeptical view that individ-
ual freedom was a myth. On the contrary, their ultimate aim was to 
create the material conditions that would free individuals to lead 
productive and happy private lives. 
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One strand of post-1937 thought attempted to avoid this con-
tradiction by reformulating the public/private distinction in prag-
matic fashion. For them, the distinction is a human construct to be 
defined and employed in ways that are useful to achieving our ends. 
But this effort to tame the contradiction simply pushes it 
deeper. A pragmatic, instrumental manipulation of the public/pri-
vate distinction presupposes that we have ends we are trying to ad-
vance. If we were sure about those ends and in agreement with 
each other, perhaps there would be no need to do more than assert 
them. But most of us engage in critical reflection about our own 
ends, and we frequently find ourselves in conflict with others about 
them. In these circumstances, many will feel a need to justify or 
explain these ends, and it is hard to mount such an explanation 
without resort to some "natural" normative framework. 
The Justices on the DeShaney Court are the uneasy benefi-
ciaries of this confused legacy of the 1930s. They are cursed with 
the knowledge that the public/private distinction is artificial and 
constructed, yet they cannot completely free themselves from a 
residual sense that something crucial would be lost if we gave it up. 
The upshot is that all the Justices selectively employ and ig-
nore the state action requirement in ways that are impossible to rec-
oncile. It could hardly be otherwise. Unless we want to give up 
altogether on the idea of individual rights, we must preserve in 
some form the notion that individuals can make some decisions 
without those decisions being attributed to the government. Yet 
unless we want to return to the pre-1937 Lochner ideology, we must 
also understand that whenever we choose, we can see the world in a 
way that makes the government responsible for those decisions. 
State action problems are authentically hard. The 1937 
Revolution has left us unable to believe in the naturalness of the 
public/private distinction, yet also unable to reconceive a system of 
individual rights without it. We want to repudiate state action rhet-
oric because we know that it blinds us to human suffering that the 
state might otherwise ameliorate. Yet we also want to embrace the 
concept of a private sphere because we know that it preserves a 
space for individual flourishing that the state might otherwise 
destroy. 
In the face of this ambivalence, it is no wonder that the 
Supreme Court's state action opinions are confused. The confusion 
is not the product of sloppy reasoning or unprincipled manipulation 
of doctrine. It is rooted in the fundamental difficulty in thinking 
about constitutional law in the legal culture we have inherited from 
1937. 
